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EXTERNAL AUDITOR SELECTION OR RETENTION:
THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEES AS BOUNDARY

GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVEA61rt

I TRODUCTION

UBRARV

Corporations often establish aud!l comrniuees to monit0r the financial repon111g
process and to reduce the likelihood of fraud, mismanagement, and financial habilny.
Verschoor (1993) found that these commmees generally review internal controls over
financial reporting and compliance wllh designated laws and regulations. While the
corporate governance structure establishes the comm1uee's compos1t1on and authority, audll
comm1ttees generally serve as 111termedianes among external and 111ternal auditors and the
full board of directors. The comm1uccs monitor the exchange of financial mformauon and
act as 1111erfaccs between the firm and the external environment (Kalbcrs and Fogerty,
1993). These funcuons allow audll comnuuecs to be classified as boundary spanners 111
organ11auonal theory. ExtenS1ve research exists conccm111g l:chav1oral explanauons of how
boundary spanner groups faalnate or 111Jluence transactions octwccn firms (Scou, Mnchell,
and Birnbaum, 1981; Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch, 1980).
Boundary spann111g roles, such as those performed by purchasing agents. involve
informa11on acqu1s111on and control, doma111 detcrnunauon, 1111erface and physical 111put
control, and fac1llla11on or 111terorgani,a11onal commerce (Jemison, 1979; Organ. 1971 ).
Jemison (I 984) associates about 60 percent of the variance 111 the inllucnce on stra1eg1c
deas1ons with boundary spanning roles, thereby s1ress111g the importance or such groups.
While other studies have focused on the organiza11onal ochav1or exh1blled by boundary
spanning groups such as purchasing agents or govern111g boards (Singh and Rhoads, 1991;
Kall and Tushman, 1983; Dolhnger, 1984). no study has yet tocuscd on the audit
comm1uees' boundary spanning conncc11on wllh the dcc1s1on concerning the sclecuon or
reten11 on of the external audllor. Other fact0rs related to the lirm's management or the
external econonuc environment may 111J1uence the sclcc11on or reten11on decision for
external audnor, but the present study will only exanune whether audit comm1uee
compos1uon charactensucs are tat1stically related to that dec1s1on. Research on Other
boundary spanning groups mc!Jcates that membership compos1110n 1s 1nJluen11al 111 the
dec1s1on process; however, that inference contrasts wllh the widely held no11on that the
comm!ltee will seek to reduce llS perceived legal nsk by making unbiased recommendauons
that are not mfluenced by comm1uce meml:crs' business assoc1auons.
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Theory of Organizational Behavior for Boundary Spanners

Boundary spanners facilitate direct (when possessing the authonty LO purchase or
select) or indirect (when occupyi ng an advisory or watchdog role) transacuons between
firms. In examining strategies for dealing with uncertainty and the subsequent decisions
that boundary spanning groups employ, Stem and Morgenroth ( 1968) found evidence of a
firm " ize" effect. Boundary spanning groups in large firms exh1b1ted l11ruts to their
considerations for choices: their behav10r was the most predictable for purchase dec1s1ons.
They often selected established products or services and were more ltkely to recommend
suppliers wnh whom they had a history of successful transacuons. Their cons1derauon of
alternatives was even more limned when compared Lo those conducted by smaller firms and
was influenced more by compaub1lny between firm structures or mformauon systems than
by pricing.
Schwab, Ungson and Brown (I 985) found that larger and smaller firms exh1bned
diffenng boundary spanning tehavior; such groups in larger firms reacted to their perceived
legal or environmental nsk through purchase decisions that stressed the quality of goods
or services and emphamed the reliability of established products or services from market
leaders. Porter (1980) suggests that the boundary spanner role changes as firms mature.
Although the emphasis on innovauon by small firms makes buyers' and suppliers' acuons
more difficult to predict, firms undergoing rapid growth ulumately move toward greater
reltab1lity and reduced vanab1lity in their deas1on choices.
Although the maJor boundary spanning behavioral studies focus on dec1s1ons of
departments and dlV1S10n sp,x1altst roles such as purchasing departments (Kolclun, 1986),
product managers (Lysonski, 1985), customer service personnel (Singh and Rhoads, 1991 ).
Joint venture specialists (Pfeffer and owak. 1976), loan orliccrs (Jemison, 1984). merger
analysts (Pfeffer, 1972) or (hospnal) governing boards (Fennell and Alexander, 1987), the
audn comnuuees' influence to select or retain auditors may follow a s1mtlar pauem.
Banunek and Reynolds (1983) claSSify CPA firm managers as boundary spanners and found
that their regulatol) obhgauons, combined wnh their subordinate pos1uon relauve to the
firm partners, caused them increased role-related stress. In response LO this increased
uncertainty, these managers adopted risk reducuon strategies. While Bartunek and
Reynolds (1983) focus on CPA finns, the authors of this paper examine the audn commmcc
as the boundary spanning group and explore the ltnkages I-ctween them, the firm, and the
external audnor.
The purpose of this study 1s 10 examine how audn cormruuccs of NYSE ltsted
companies select or retain their audnors in order to determine 1f this choice or
recommendauon corresponds LO previously observed ooundary spanning behavior wnh a
tendency toward the farnthar or the well established (e.g., selecting or retaining an audit
firm that is also the same one employed by an audit cormruttec memlx:r's primary
employer).
The authors examine the characterisucs of both the audit comm1uee eompos1uon and
the external auditor in order LO 1dent1fy any factors that ltnk these two groups in the
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deas1on to select or retain an auditor. A sample of NYSE fi rms that witched auditors ,s
also examined to deterrrune tf the change m auditors follows expected boundary spanning
behavior for large organ11at1ons or swnchmg toward market leaders, more established
servtccs, or tinn.s pos.sc-..'ilng Strrular mformauon or organizauonal structures (i.e .. to detect
,fa tendency ex1'tS to swllch to an e;r;tcmal audit firm that 1s used by an audll comrruttce
member's pnmary emplo)l.!r or to swnch to an audll fi rm wuh a larger market share m the
audnec's mdu'ill")) Both audit committee compos1uon charactensucs and e;r;tcmal audllor
finn.s' market shares arc examined to sec 11 they help explain the outcome ot auditor sv. nch
dcc1s1ons.
Audit Committee Function<, and Interaction'>

In 1947. the.: Amencan lnstllute ol CPAs (AICPA) informally supportc.:d the.: audit
committc.:c.: concept in a Journal of Accountancy cdllonal (Carey, 1947); m 1967 and m
1977. the AICPA formally endorsed the commmec concept as a means ol strengthening the
CPA', mt.lepcn<lencc.: and pcrlorm:mce (Cottcl and Rankin, 1989). Smee 1978. the NYSE
has required us listed firms to use audit comrruttccs comprised or m<lcpcndcnt directors.
\l. ootc.:n ct al ( 1994l note that the United tates Senate\ MctLJlf Report exprcss..:d
c mcern a1'1u1 \\hc.:thcr :iud1tors v.ere "m<lepcn<lc.:nt m fact from the interests of their
corporate clients" and warned that "cxc·ess1\'e market concentratton tra<l1ttonally causes
prohkms cuncernmg the pncc.: and a\a1lah1llty ol goods and ser.·1ces."
Au<ln wmmmee, may tormally sc.:lett or rc.:tam an external auditor. hut that <lec1'1on
1s al',(11nl1ucncc.:d hy management's input. Pc.:aNm and R;ans (1982) and Rutting ( 1994)
I< unJ that managc.:mc.:nt gc.:m:rall> \,clcomc.:J the commntec.:'s tn\'ohc.:mc.:nt m sclewng the
e-.;tc.:mal aut.lJtor,. nc.:got1atmg their tees. :mt.I <letcrm1ning au<lll arrangements. laut, and
Neumann (I 977) cne<l the commntee's role as an mtermed1ar; hctv.cen the lirm
m.magemcnt .mJ thL C'l(tema .,uJnor \Ian} relent ..\!CPA Audn·ng t,m<lanls Board
Statement\ on Audnmg Stand:in.J\ at.It.Ire" the reporung requirements hct\,een the audit
commntee and the au<lnor.
S ,me of the rescarlh in the deCI ,,on 1,1 swuch audnors 1, rnnsl\tC.:nt \\ ll h the txiun<lar;
sp:mnmr beha\1or menttonc<l earlier Alter studying 67 if the I I 2 Amcman Stock
Exchange member tirm, that sv.nched audn Jrs lrnm 197:l to 1978. E1chcnschi.:r and
Sh1e1t.1, 19!0) I 1un<l that c 1mpanie, wllh audn L 1mmntecs e'l(h1hne<l sigmlicantl; more
prnpcnsny to s\,1tch to Big Eight (now Big 1x) tirm, than those \\llhout such comrruttees.
They suggested that previously t.le\clOpc<l business rclattonshtps could part1all> e"'plam the
sck-ctt, nor retcnuon ot external audlwrs. although other lauor, als,1 ma) affect or control
the dcn,,on prorcs, (e.g.. pcn:e1vc<l prcsugc or the au<lll lirm m the in<lustr}. the tirm·,
managcnal go\cmance ,tructure, company ,11e. <lcbJTec of tinanoal lc\Cragc. or whether
the compan> ,pcrates in regulated industry).
Other 'ilut.lJcs have also helped c.:xplatn this propcnslly to select Big Eight auditors: I)
larger companies prefer <lealtng v. llh larger rather than ,mailer au<lll firms (Dopuch and
S1munic 19XO): 2) the more owners a company ha,. the more likely the company will
Sou1hern /Ju.smtn Rt,·1th
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employ Big Eight firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976); 3) regulated companies tend to select
audit firms with technical pccialties in these industries (Eichensehcr and Danos, 1981 );
4) only large CPA firms with multiple offices can usually audll large companies with
mulliple locations. The present tudy exami nes the existence of stausucally detectable
associations t:etween the audit committee composition or external audnor tirm factors and
the decision to select or retain a specific external audit firm.
THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THIS STUDY

Previous organizauonal t:ehavior research found that choices or recommcndauons
made by boundary spanners in large firms can t:e explained based on characteristics of the
boundary spanning group. Their tchav1or 1s often reflected in choices for a famtliar
informational or organizauonal structure or m purchases 111chncd toward the market leader.
In recommending the selection or retention of external auditors, this choice may be related
to characteristics of the compos1uon of the audit commtnee and linkages LO (or market
pos1uon of) the external auditor. The first part of this study mvesugates the rclauonsh1p
issue by simultaneouslyexamtmng audll commtttee composn1on factors. external auditor
charactensucs, and the resemblance of the selected or retamed external audnor to the one
used by an audit commtttcc mcmt:er's pnmaryemployer. Wlule firms rarely swnch external
auditors, the second pan of this study invcsugates whether factors of the audit commtttec's
compos1uon can d1scnmmate octwcen firms that do and do not switch audnors. In
add111on, the market share of the predecessor and successor auditors arc stattstically
compared t0 detect possible trends toward market leaders rcsultmg from the aud1tor
switches.
EMPIRICAL STUDY

The authors randomly selected 246 NYSE listed firms and 1den11ficd the names and
aflihauons of the audit committees external members from their 1987 annual reports.
Table I summanL.Cs the size of the audit commtttcc and the number of firms in the sample.
The top pomon of Table 2 displays the nurnrer of Big Six auditors selected or retained
by the NYSE firms compared to the Big Six external aud11or employed hy a committee
memt:er's pnmaryemployer.1 The lower pomon of Table 2 mcludes the expected frequency
of occurrence t:etween the Big Six auditor that the firm selected or retained compared to the
Big Six auditor used by the audit commtt1ee member's primary employer under the null
hypothesis of no associauon tctween the commmce's firm cmploymg an external auditor
and the audit commtttcc memtcr's primary employer.
A clu square contingency table test of the count data associated with Table 2 111d1catcs
a stallst1cally significant aSSOCJauon (chi squared= 45.5852, pdXl72) 1:-ctwcen the selected
or retained external auditor for the NYSE firm and the external auditor employed by the
audit commlllee member's primary employer.3 For all Big Six firms, the counts on the main
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Table 2 (continued)
External Audito r for Audit Commillee
M embers' Prirnar Emplo~er

Finn's

AudJtor
AA

EY

CL

OT

P"1
, I l7

16.5"

n
I l7

14.74

EY

ll.95

28 56

26 .U

1851

16 91

2460

CL

ISM

:0.()-4

1"11

ll 18

12 2,

17 77

OT

7.69

10.01

9 ,7

6.4,

S 91

Kb:?

P"1

7.21

9 \~

H9

5 56

~o,

PW

IS.54

:?U :?:'

18 71

ll'>'l

IH?

4

H

gJ

10,

IOIAL

ll 41

AA

Total

I•

6

1111

.

'>'l

48
4'

97

~18

DI

AA
Arthur Andersen & Co.

0.:10111.: &. rouche

Ernst & Young
Cl..
Cooper. &. I. ~brand

PW
Pru.:c Wat~rhou~

FY

PW

17.16

19.18

P\1

KP'vlG Poat "1arl\lt~

diagonal or the matnx from upper lelt to lower ngh1 arc higher lor the actual employment
count (upper table) than for the expected count (lower table). which 1s de\clopcd from the
null hypothesis of stattst1cal independence lx:tween the choice ot external audnor u-;cd tiy
the commmcc mcmrcr's pnmary employer and the -;clec1ed or retained external auditor for
the firm Hence, a higher incidence that a Big Six audit firm 1s -;elected or retained when
the collUTUttee memtx:r's pnmary emplo)er selects or retains that same audit firm 1s seen.
Evidence ot a higher incidence of matching between the ex1ernal auditor and the auditor
employed hy a commmcc mcmtx:r's pnmary emplo)'!r than would re expcued from random
events alone was stat1st1call} detected, but other factors ma) help exag!!erate this
circumstance.
Orgamzat1onal theory suggests tha1 houndary spanmng groups 1n large tirrns seek
transactions w1th firms posscssrng a s1rntlar informattonal or a fam11Iar orga1111at1onal
structure to reduce p.:rt.-c1ved nsk. (Fennell and Alexander. 1987). The stat1st1cal test hascd
on the 111d1v1dual commmce member's relat1onsh1p to an auditor through h1<Jher pnmary
employer confirms this observation. However, srnce the entire comrruttee, rather than an
111d1v1dual member alone, mlluences the dec1s1on to select or rctam the external auditor.
factors ot the audit comrruttcc's compos1tton 1hat may be associated with the trend wward
seleamg or retru mng a farm liar auditor and the external auditor's market share associated
w1th that outcome were exammed.
6-
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Cross-sectional Pre dictability for Auditor Choice

Similarities or differences of individual audit committee member's backgrounds can
influence his/her recommendations. One may expect frequent matched correspondences
(between the choice for retained or selected external audit0rs compared to the audn firm
used by any audit COll11111tlCC member's primary employer) tf most committee members share
a relationship to the same audit firm through their pnmary employers. Coll11111ttee
members may believe they can reduce perceived nsk by recommending the selectton or
retention of an audit firm wnh whom they are familiar through pnmary employer
relauonships. External observers may view this as a bias although boundary spanning
groups often make the choice t0ward the farrultar (in order t0 reduce risk).
The sample of 246 firms contained 53 companies with "consensu!-" audit0rs, where
most of the company's audit C01l11111llec members were primanly employed by companies
using the same external audit0r. Consensus here indicates that the retained or selected
external audnor 1s the same Big Six auditor used by the pnmary employers of more than
half of the audll comrruttee members per sampling unit. The remaining 193 selected or
retained auditors arc called "non-consensus" audnors.
Research on other ooundary spanning groups has found that the groups often purchase
from fi rms wnh which they have previously established relat1onsh1ps (At-TwatJn and
Montanan, 1989). For audtt comrrnttccs, thts snuatton would be confirmed 1s an unusuall)
high incidence occurs in which the selected or retained external aud1tor matches the one
used by a commntee memb!r's pnmary employer. The issue of possible assoc1auons
between the audu commntcc compos1t1on and the external audu firm was examined by
stat1sucally tcSting whether factors \Uch as audtt comrrnttee compostt1on are associated with
a trend toward some farrnltar mformattonal or organ11at1onal structure. Sin<A: the tendency
may tx: stronger for consensus audit cases, both consensus and non-consensus cases were
examined separately lrom·the overall analysis.
Discriminant Analysis

D1scnminant analysts ts a mult1vanate statistical methodology that reduces a set of
multtplc measurements on one or more vanables into a It near composite wtth values that
maximally d1st1ngu1sh memtx:rsh1p lx:twccn two or more groups.
The general functional form of a model can be given as:
(I)

where Z 1s the score which classifies observattons into groups, the X, are independent
van ables, the cocflic1ents b; are the d1scnrrnnant weights and c 1s a constant or intercept
term. Dtscnminant analysis essenttally takes the independent variables (X,'s) as measured
for each of two groups and derives a Z-compositc score uch that the scores of the groups
have a minimum of overlap. KJeinooum, Kupper and Muller (I 988), Anderson (1958), and
Somht!rn Business Rev,e,~
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Stuan and Ord (1991) provide a mathematical background for dlscnminant analysis, and
Nichols (1987), Koh and Killough (1990), Bricker (1989), Baldwin and Glelen (1992), and
others have previously applied this technique to perform audit research.
Discriminant analysis is a branch of the general linear model that includes multiple
linear regression. Other boundary spanning studies (Bartunek and Reynolds, 1983;
Dollinger, 1984: and At-Twaijur and Montanan, 1989) employed muluple linear regression
in their empincal analysis.
One means of detecti ng whether a trend toward the famtliar informattonal or
organizational structure exists 1s by measuring how often the external audt tor 1s the same
one that is employed by at least one commtttee members' pnmary employer. For the 246
firms in the sample, stepwise discrimtnant analysis was used to determine which (if any)
aucht commmee compos111on factor or charactensttc of the external auditors will yield the
stausucally 1gmficant capability to dlscnminate octween two groups:
NO MATCH: firms in which the selected or retained auditor is not the same auditor
as the pnmary employer of any audit commtttcc member.
MATCH: firms in which the selected or retained audttor 1s the same auditor for the
primary employer of at least one audit commtuee member.
A higher mStance of matches than can be explained by random vanauon in the earlier
analysis was found. In this secuon, the focus 1s not c!Jrectly in the forecasting version of
model (I). but in detecung stausucally which variables (X,'s) enter the equauon or
c!Jscnmmate retween a match compared to no match. In order to invesugate which fact0rs
concemtng aucht commmcc composiuon or the external audttor contnbute to separattng the
groups OMATCH or MATCH, the authors consider constructing independent van ables
(X's) by cons1denng the following categones:
Effect of Audit Committee Size. Fennell and Alexander ( 1987) found increased
predJctabihty m choices mvolvmg external purchases or linkages as the Sile of a hospttaJ's
govcrnmg board increased. Larger boards were asSOCtated wtth percepllons of a more
stnngcnt regulatory environment and strategies to reduce perceived nsk. S1mtlarly, larger
audtt commtttces may be less flexible and seek to reduce perceived nsk by selecung or
retruning external auc!Jtors with an established or famtliar informauonal or orgamlall onal
structure. As audit committee size increases. a tendency may exist for the retained or
selected aud1t0r to match wtth one employed by an auc!Jt commtttcc member's pnmary
employer. lf matches occur more frequently than would oc predicted by random probability
theory when the size of non-consensus audit commtttecs increases, then stronger support
exists for the commtttcc 1ze effect.
Familiarity. Leifer and Deltccg (1978) suggest that boundary spanners seek lO protect
the enuty from environmental stress noung, for example, that purchasing strategics often
consider only limited choices and select goods or services from well established firms. It
a substanual number or a proportion of audit commtuec members 1s acquainted wtth the
informauonal structure of an external audttor firm that their pnmary employer uses, the
commmee may more likely retain or select the same external auc!Jtor. Under a blind
selecuon process, audit firms would have equal probab1httes of being selected or retained.
-8-
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However, under the farrultanty concept, as the proportion of audit committee members
whose primary employers use any Big Six audit firm rises, so too will the likelihood that
the selected or retained auclitor will match the one used by some audit committee member's
primary employer. Pincus. Rusbarsky and Wong (1989) detected an associa11on between
the proponion of corporate outside directors and the voluntary formauon of audu
comnuttees of NASDAQ firms. They inclicated that outside clirectors may seek to reduce
informa11on asymmetry l:::ctwccn the external auditor and the client firm in order to limit
personal l1ab1lity or to address poten11al agency cost 1mplica11ons.
Dominant Market Share. Kall and Kahn (1978) sugge t that the role of boundary
spanning groups 1s to relate the orgam,auon to us larger community or social system. One
result of this respons1b1lity 1s a tendency to choose market leaders or established goods or
services on the grounds or higher qualuy and reltab1luy. Larger or more established CPA
firms may adverusc their services to the audit commmee w11h this theme; hence, matches
may occur more often for aud11 firms wuh larger market shares.
Based on these general factors from the boundary spanning ltterature, the following
independent or X, variables (measured for each firm in our sample) were invcs11gated:
X1:
X2:
X,:
X,:

the s1,c (or numbcr of mcmrers) of the audn comnuttcc.4
the numrer ol audit commmcc mcmrers whose primary employer use any Big
Six aud11or.4
the propomon ol auclit comm111cc mcmt-crs whose primar:,- employ..:r uses an:,B1g Six Aud11or •
the industr:,- market share for the external aud11or selected or retained by the
firm.\

The dummy variables for 1he external audit firms ,,ill tal-.e on value I for the named
firm and Ofor any other tirm (e.g .. the dummy variable for Arthur Andersen ts dclincd as:
AA= I 1f Arthur Ander....:n 1s selected or retained for the firm,
AA= 0 ti any lirm other than Arthur Andersen 1s selected or retained for 1hc firm.
Dummy ,anabb were delined tor Arthur Andersen (AA). Coopers & Lybrand (CL),
Ernst & Young (EY), Deloitte & Touche (DT), Peat Marwick (PM) and Pnce Waterhouse
(PW). These dummy variables allow the mclus1on of the qual11a11ve effect of differing Big
Six audn firms wuh rcsixct to clctecung 11 they arc s1a11sttcally mfluent1al in d1scnmma11ng
between membership in the h'T0ups OMATCH and MATCH-the Y variable in equatton
(I). Johnson and Wichern (1982) and Kleinbaum, Kupper and Muller (1988) provide
detruls about the use of dumm, vanables. Symbols for the dummy van ables arc the same
as those given m Table 2.
The vanablcs X., X2 and X3 may bc co-linear. Using dummy variables can confound
the discnmmant analysis approach, and a direct d1scnminant or log1sttc regression could
yield biased error csumates. Since the authors sought to clctect which vanables arc related
-9-

10 the discrimination of the match and the no match groups, the stepwise methodology of
Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980), Cohen ( 1991) and O'Gorman and Woolson (I 991) was
used 10 improve the variable selection process.
The stepwise discnmmant analysis was conducted separately for all 246 firms, the
substrata for 53 consensus audit commiuce firms and the 193 non-consensus audit
comminee firms.6 Table 3 di plays the mean value for each independent vanable (X
vanable and dwnrny van ables) in the O MATCH and MATCH groups to compare these
two groups. For the enure sample of 246 firms, the variables detected as s1a11s11cally
significant predictors with respect 10 whether the selected or retained auditor will be the
same one used by at least one audit corruruuee memocr's pnmary emplo,er were X,, the
proponion of audn commmee membcrs whose pnmary employers use a Big Six auditor and
the dwnrny vanables for CL The sclecuon or significant variables was obtained using the
step-wi~ cliscnmmant analysis methodology. and the mean values reported in Table 3 arc
only used 10 1llustratc the change in mean level of the independent variable associated w1th
the MATCH and O MATCH groups. The mean \alues ma:,, I"\! fairly close when the
indeix:ndcnt vanable 1s not a cliscnmmator rctween the MATCH and NO MATCH groups.
However. the difference in mean values would re considered s1a11s11cally significant for
indcix:ndcnt vanables selected for inclusion during the stepwise d1scnmmant algonthm1c
procedure.
Table 3 shows that the proporuon ol comm!ltee members in which the pnmary
cmplo,cr\ auduor 1s any Big Six auduor a\erages 55 percent for audll c:ommutees in which
the external audnor 1s the same as a comm1nce membcr's pnmary employer's audnor
(MATCH group). By contrast, the proporuon of audn commntee memocrs whose pnmary
emplo,cr uses an, Big Six audnor averages 15 percent for firms in which the selected or
retained auduor dlllcrs from the cxtcmal audlwr for the primary employcr ot any commntce
member (NO MATCH group): thereforc. as the proportion or commlllee mcmbcrs \\llh
pnmary employers using Big Six audnors inucases, a h1ghcr probabilny that the selcctcd
or retained auditor will match the exwmal auditor for an audn rnrrurunce memt-cr's primary
emplO)Cr's external audnor 1s apparent. The grcater the proport10n or audit comm1ttce
members wnh allihauons to a Big Six firm through their primary emplo,crs, the more
likely the selected or retained auditor will be one employed t,y a commntee memt-cr's
primary emplo,cr
The dwnrny vanablc for CL 1s s1gruficant, and the higher mean proportion (.25) tor the
MATCH group indicates that, on average, 25 percent ot audit commmecs selecting or
retaining the same audnor as the external audnor tor at least one corruruncc memt-cr's
pnmary employer use CL. This proporuon falls to 14 percent of commmccs selecting or
reta1rung CL m the group m wluch the selet1cd or retained auditor d1flcrs from the external
auditor for the pnmary emplo:,,er of any audit corruruuee member (the NO MATCH group);
therefore, when the selected or retained external auditor coincides with at least one
comrruttcc member's pnmary employer, CL has a higher incidence of being the selected or
retained auditor than expected under a random chance model.
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Table 3
Oiscrirniruint \ nah,i, of246
Al I (246)
\,II \\i
\io \1 Itch \1.11,h

X
X

X

x,
A/I
CL

I'\\

LY

P\1

DI

I 17
I 62
0 .l5
17 10

o lO

0.14
016
0 25
010
0 J:1

...

.

146
2.40
0.55
16.71
0.19
() 2~
0.20

O.lO

oo-

007

,vs1:, H,tcd rorms( 1987)

CO:S:SI :S:SL"S (53)
"tLl\.\i
\io \latch \talch
ql')

3.06
0.61
, .. :!')

•

012
OJ)'>

O.IS

() 1.l
O(l<l

OIX

•

440
l I5
07 1
1498
020
0.15
0.40
0.20
005
0.00

\iO:-J -CO\iSl;'ISl ·s (I91>
\II -\.'\
'\o \I.11th \IJlth
4 12
I 26

OlX

17.05

..

0"

01~
<US
() 1:?
0 I

Oil

4 4,
216

o.,o

-

0 l'l

01 1
1

0 11
0 21

(10,

010

'\o \latch
firm, "hi.'rl! t~ .,._-klh.:d or rd.11ni:J aud1l1)r 1s not th,.:, sJm~ .ht~ «::,h.•rn;il Jud1h1r \!mplo~cJ b, .m~ .111J1t lomnutt1.--e
Uh.'mh..:r\ pmnar\.- ~mplo\ ·r
\I.11th
lmn, \\ ll\:rC t~ \.l.:l 'l t,.:J or rl!'t.,1!ll!d aud1tLr I th,.: ,Jm • .1, th,: 1,: ,1i:rn.1I auJ1h,r "mplo, J h) .ll I .i-.t ,1111! .t0d1t
c.:omm1th.'1.' m1:mhl.·r\ pnm.iry \!mpln\i..:r
X rommltll!e ,ui..:
:\ "-umh,:r ol audit c.om1111tt~I! 1111.:mlx:r, \\ho'-"'-' prnn.1ry emplo\..:r u""-'' an\- Big S1, .1uJ11 tum
X Proportion ol .lUdll lontmllt,.,1,; 11\1..'llllxr, \\h11~ prim.tr\.- ,·mpln}i!T u.....:, ., Bil? S1, .1uU11or

X: 1 markd ,hak ( ) ol th..,; ri;ta1n,.,:J ,n s..:I i..1cJ c,tcrn.1I jUJ1k1r
\,\ \rthur \n<l rs..:n pr,>J'll.lJt1,1n CI C1..x.1p,:rs ,\ I \hr.md prnrort1nn
I Y I rn,t &. Yourw pwpurtaon
l 1 \t KP\1<.j 1•~-H \.IJC\\Kk prnr.., rt1on
\l't'llll p< 10
,1l1 nit p < 05
I ) d nnks .1inpl 11
••• ,1l'!llll p < 01

I) I

l k)~111t .\. I oudl.: ph pot11,1n
1'\\ Pril~ \\ .tkrhou-..c pu port11..1n

For roth the cnn--.:nsu, .mu n01H n--.:nsu, ,uhsamplcs. 1he "\ \ .iri.Lblc "a ,1a11,t1Lall1
,1gmtiL,Llll <.lN.nmmator '1 \\een the \I\TCH .mu I e ,o \!AT( II !'.r ,ups.\\ h1d1 .,t,rn,
\\>Ith 1he mlerence ol the earlier .mal)"' 11n,1hrng the ennre ,.1mpk it 2-1r, tirm,. rl1e
dumm, \,mahlc tor CL 1, .11,o ,till a ,1g111ti1..tnl d ,,r '17 ll.lhlr t\:l\\ee, the \I \TCII and
the O MA fCH groups 11Ndc 1hc 11O11-c.:O11--.:n,u, sample \\llh the sam,· d1rcc11onal
mfcrenLe
While the -.ample ,11c 1s ,mall. some e,1ucnce ex ,ts tor PV. and OT ,Ls d1,Lnm111a1nr,
h:l\\.:Cn the t\\ gr,,1..ps t(,r rnn....:n,us rnmnuuee,. P\\ ha, J h ).!'1er th.•n rand 1•n d1.11K1.'
ot h:111r 1he --.:lcu.:d ,1r ret.uned c,ternal .1udllor when a match e\1s1, l"\:l\\CCn the e\ t1.•rnal
aud11or and the auditor cmpt,,1ed h1 .tl lea,1 one audll u1mmu1ec memh:r', pnmar)
emplo)cr On the other h;md. there 1, ;1 ht).!her hl..ehh,~xl 1h;t1 OT 1, the --.:lccted or retained
auduor when the c,1em;tl auwtor 1, not 1he '1!11e as am emplO)CU h, ,nme aud11 comrn111ce
meml:x:rs' pnmar) emplo1er.
Sm11hern IJunnt'\ \ Rt\ tfh

II

lndu try Effects

Schwab, Ungson and Brown (1985) found evidence of industry specific behavior for
boundary spanning groups. In order to invesugate this circumstance, the 246 firms of the
study were divided into the following industry categories:
I. Manufacturing
2. Distribution and Retail
3. Financial Services
4. Telecommunications and Public Uuht1es
5. Oil & Gas Extracuon
6. Health Care
7. Oiher lndustnes
The sample size available 10 compare the O MATCH and the MATCH groups for the
stepwise chscnrrunant analysis model (I) was adequate for analysis only 111 manufactunng,
finance and the other indusmes ca1egones. The summary results, 111 a form analogous 10
the format for Table 3, appear m Table 4. The 111depcndent vanahle X3 1s a significant
discnrrunator lx:tween groups for NO MATCH and MATCH for both manufacturing and
the other mdustnes category. The 111terpretauon ol the ellect of X3 1s s1111Jlar to what was
observed m the previous analysis of all 246 firms.

Table 4
Discriminant \ nalysis "•thin the lndu,trv Catcl!on

MANL'FAC-ll"RI\G ( 125)
"1l·A.'\
'-o \,latch \latch

x,
x,

X,

x.
AA

CL

PW

EY

P"1
DT

4 1R
I 55
0.33
16 45
017
0.14
0.20
023
016
0.08

.....

.

f-l:-SMCl·.(15)
\II ·\.''-o \latch \,latch

4 53
2 76
0.62
15.49

125
I 75
0.45
18 26

0.16
026
029
0.16
0.08
0.05

011

0.00

0.00
0.63

0.00

0 25

.

OTlll·R IND (:19)
\I[· \.'-

'-o \latch \,latch

4 .86
2 57
0.55
19.47

4 :17

I 50
0 :1 I
19 40

0.00
029
0. 14
041
014
000

021
OOR
0.08
013
0.08
021

.. t
t

4.07
2 I1
051
161,
020
020
0.20
020
0.1:1
007

\olc. Su Table 3 for details of abbrev,auons
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The dummy variable for CL was a significant discriminator for the manufacturing and
the financial services' industries with an interpretation that follows the same direction as
the earlier analysis of all 246 firms. Only the new variable, X4 , for the market share of the
external auditor in the other industry category entered as a discriminator, although the
mean values of the X, variable for the two groups (NO MATCH and MATCH) are not in
the expected direction. In this case, the market share of the external auditor is lower for the
group where the retained or selected auditor is the same as the external auditor for some
committee member's primary employer (MATCH group). However, the other industry
category is a collection of less homogeneous businesses (compared 10 the other six
categories), and the relauvely small sample size could influence this result.
The discriminant results ofTable 4 indicate the significant discriminators (X, vanables)
that predict membership in the two groups, NO MATCH and MATCH, differ among the
industry groups. This hypothesis can be directly established using Analysis of
Covariance-a tatistical methodology that te ts whether the linear models (estimated
inside different strata or subsamples) are the same or whether the coefficients of the X,
variables of model (I) differ (Johnson and Wichern, 1982; Stuan and Ord, 1992). The
results of the overall Analysis of Covariance test indicated significant differences in b,
coefficients of the dtscrirrunant models (I), e ti mated w11hin the manufactunng. finance
and other mdustry categones (pd)6). Thi s result also valtda1es the inferences from Table
4 and s1a11s11cally establishes the presence of industry specific effects for 1he explana11on
of the association between the selected or retained aud11or for the firm compared to the
characten sucs of the aud11 committee composiuon.
In general, the selccuon or retenuon of the auditor exhibits s1a11s1ically s1gndicant
predictable behavior based on variable for the audit commi11ee membership: a high
proponion of aud11 comm111cc members whose primary employers use any Big Six aud11or
corresponds to an increased inc1dencc of a match between the selected or retained aud11or
and some comrru11ee member's primary employer's aud11or. Thi s inference corresponds
with the farrultanty argumcm for boundary spanning groups and does not suppon the issue
of comrruttee members independently recommending audtt firms. The dtrecuon of these
inferences generally agree wtth the behavior exh1 b11cd by other boundary spanning groups.

EXAMINING AUDITOR SWITCHING DECI IONS
As stated above, audtt comrruttccs seldom ,;w11ch auditors. However. many researchers,
including Johnson and Lys (1990), Haskins and Williams (I 990), Danos and E1chenseher
( 1982), Eichenseher and Shields (I 983), and Etchenseher and Danos (I 98 I). suggest that
CPA firms seek to increase their overall market share by gaming compe1111ve advamages
in certain 111che markets. Hence, in order to focus on audit comrruttees' tchav10r when
firms Swttch auditors, the researchers enlarged the sampling frame from the 246 companies
in 1987 to consider a time senes study of 121 NYSE-listed companies that switched
auditors from 1984-1987. The addiuonal sample provide an opponumty to check earlier
conclusions. The stepwise discrirrunant functi on was es11mated to find any srnusucally
Soulhtrn Business Revie,v
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significant variables for these 121 companies using the same grouping categories (NO
MATCH and MATCH) and the same set of independent variables defined in the earlier
section.
Table 5 summarizes the mean values of the independent 09 variables for comparing
groups (NO MATCH to MATCH) along with an indication of which of these independent
variables are statistically significant discriminawrs between the two groups. The analysis
was done for all 121 companies as well as the 33 consensus subsample and the 88
non-conrensus subsample. The results are not identical to those m the previous section, but
the same type of boundary spanning group behavior is detected.
Table 5
Discriminant Analysis o r NYSE-Listed Firms That S"Hchcd Auditor<
(1984-1987)
All ( 121 )

Consensus (33)

Non.Con.sensus (88)

mean

mean

mean

No Motch

x,

X,

x,

x..

AA

CL
PW

EY

P'vl
DT

3.31
0.62
0. 19
17.60
0.14
0.19
0.12
0.21
0.18
0. 16

...

Match

No Match

3.56
1.65
0.47
16.00

3.04
0.88
0.32
16.56

0.25
0.15
0.15
0.25
0.05
010

0.04
0.16
0.12
020
020
0.24

..
••
•

Match

No Match

3.38
I 75
0.57
15.58

3.39
0 53
015
17.94

0.38
025
013
0.13
0.00
0.13

0 .17
020
0. 12
0.21
0.17
0.13

...

Match

3.59
1.58
0.41
16.26
0.17
0.08
0.17
0.33
0.08
0.08

Note: See Table 3 for details or obbrev,auons

The proporuon of commmec memrers whose primary employer uses a Big Six audttor
1s a significant dlscrirrunator to dlsttngu1sh octween the NO MATCH and MATCH
groups for all samples. Again. a dec1s1on outcome toward the selecuon of a farrultar or
established mformauon structure 1s seen.
The dummy vanable for Anhur Andersen (AA) 1s a significant discnrrunator between
the groups for NO MATCH compared to MATCH m the consensus sample. For fi rms m
which the external audttor 1s the same as that employed by an audit comrruttee member's
primary employer (MATCH group), there 1s a greater likelihood that AA will be the
selected or retained auditor. CL 1s also a signifi cant discnmmator m this subsample, and
the inference 1s m al1grtment with the earlter srudy of246 firms that did not switch audi tors.
Overall, comrruuee composnion characteristics can be associated with the incidence that
(X3 )
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certain auditors arc selected or retained and 1ha1 certain auditor firms show a higher
incidence of being selected or retained as the external auditor.
Effect of Auditor\ Market Share

The earlier analysis examines the assoc1auon between 1hc comrruuec's charac1ens11cs
and those of the successor aud1tor for lirms that switched auditors hut did not address an}
compansons of the predecessor and successor external audnors when a switch occurs. Ir
boundary spanning groups Lend LO select market leaders. n nughL be expected 1ha1 the
succes.<;0r external audnor will cxh1h1t a higher market share in the lirm's indus1r,. Table
6 displays the mean market share for predecessor and successor audnors in the sample of
firms 1hm sW11chcd audnors during 1984 through 1987. A paired difference Student L-Lest
indicates that market share 1s s1gmlicamly higher for 1he successor 1han the predecessor
(p<.001 ). Again. 1he empincal evidence agrees wnh 1he general behavior 1ha1 has reen
detected for mher boundary spanning groups.
Table 6
Pmrccl Cornp;m,on or \larkct Slu1re for Prederessor and ',urrc,sor \uditors or the 121 , YSF-1.i,tccl
Firrn, I hat Snitctwd \udilor,
( l98~- 1987)
\13rket Sh.ir,
1\ud1tor

Prcdc:c~,-.or

Succ.:c:v,,or

DiM:rimin ating Between Switch and

\11.c:an

St.me.Jard Dev1at1on

D.204
I" ,2s

~.0196
56651

o Swi tch Dcci'>ion'>

Co111:I and R,mkin's ( 1989) study ol thl: \JauonJI Asso(1J11on ol Sccunucs
Dealcrs-hsicd compamt:s tound soml: swnching 10 Big E1gh1 tirms tiu1 a11nhu1ed such sh1t1s
to company managt:mcm ,1111tudcs. the Foreign Corrupt Pracuces Act or 1977, legal
prcssurt:, and ht:1ghll:ncd in<lustf} compctn1,eness ra1ht:r than LO audit hrms' compc1111vc
strategit:s. Eichenscher and Shields (1985) hypotht!s111: a d1rt!tt corrdauon between au<ln
comm1ncc formm1on and re11:n11on ot Big Eight lirms. pnmanly mouvaied by 1hc belief in
1he Big E:.ight tirms' expertise and managem1:n1\ pcrcc1,ed h!gal nsk aversion.
Boundary spanning behavior s1u<llt:s inter 1hat tht: successor audnor may bc morc
fam1har 10 the comm111cc memters or be more established in the lirm's industry group. This
suggests that commn1ce compos111on vanablt:s such as X, (aud11 comrruttcc s1,e), X2 (1hc
number of audit comnuuee members whose pnmary cmplo;a uses a Big Six audit tirm)
Southern Busmess Rti.:1th,
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or X.i(the projX)nion of audit commi11ee members whose primary employer uses a Big Six
audit firm) might discrinunate between firms that do and do not swnch audnors.
To test this hypothesis. the author compared the original sample of 246 firm with all
121 NYSE-listed firms that switched audnor between 1984-1988. For firms that swnched
auditor , the designated the successor aud11or as the external audnor. basing the analy 1s
on finding which vanables di cnminate between 1he two groups:
SWlTCH: firms that swnched auditors
0 SWlTCH: firms that did not switch audnors.
Table 7 presents the means of mdcpcndent \'ariable values within 1he SWJTCH and O
SWITCH groups, along wnh an ind1ca11on of which or these X, \'artablcs arc s1gmlicant
d1scnminators te1wcen the two groups. While the results do not cs1abhsh causality, the
data demonstra1c cenam stal!Stical assoc1a11ons: larger comrruuccs arc less likely lO w, nch.
and companies that do no1 swnch arc more likely to be associated wnh larger s11cd aud11
comnuuccs. A reduced likelihood ol an audttor sw11ch also exists as the propor11on of audn
commi11ee members whose primary employers use a Big Six external audnor increases.
Some auclit firm spcalic eV1dencc exists: Peat Marw1e1' (PM) had a higher incidence as the
successor aud11or for those firms that swnchcd audnors.

Table 7
Anal)sis to Detect Factors Which D1<crlm111alc llct"ccn the S"ilch and '-o-m1tch Outcome, for
the J..,xlrrnnl Auditor
Ou1comc

S"ll<h(l2I)

x,
X

x,
X,

.\A

CL

PW
FY
P\1
D'I

3.34
0.79
024
17:10
0.16
0.18
0.12
0.21
016
015

...

'"

•

I

\;o S,\lt<h <2-16)
4 47

1.88
0.42
17.00

0.20
0.18
0.17
0.23
009
0 II

\;ote: Sec Table 3 for details of abbrevoat,on,,
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CONCLUSIONS
Audit commmees funcuon as boundary spanning groups that fac1l11ate
interorgamzauonal commerce and informauon acqutslllon. Studies on other houndar)
spanning groups find that large fi rms' dec1s1on tx:hav,ors arc associated wit h certain
tdcnufiablc factors. Firms tend to reduce pcrcc1vcd n sk by -;clewng goods or services from
established brands. market leaders. or suppliers with a s1mtlar informauonal or
organizauonal structun:. Evidence was found that for NYSE-ltstcd firms the sclccuon or
retcnt1 on of an external aud11or 1s stausucally related 10 audit commmec compos1uon
charactcnsucs. In add111on. market leaders or large aud11 firms arc more ltkd} to tx:
selected or retained as the external auditor. In add1uon to these tx:ha\tOr,. thac arc
sp;aal11ed effects tor L'Cnam mdustnes such as manulactunng or linancc. The cffcc1 ol :m
aud11or firm's market share in an indust ry exh1b11s a s1aus11cally significant effect ,n thl!
cases in which an auditor s,, 1tch occurs. Although auditor switches occur mfrequentl). 11
,,as found that the successor auditor has a larger market share in 1hl! 1ndu,1ry 1h.m thl!
predecessor auditor. O, erall. the findings 1nd1catc that the dcc1St0n outcoml! for the
sdecuon or retcnuon ol e,ternal auditors b} large lirms lits in the same och,J\loral
framework pn:v10usly established for other boundar, spanning roles
h DNOT ES

For eumplc. four of the n111l! "Exp;ctauons G.ip" SAS, 1,sued in I988 1m ohe audit
comm111ccs. SAS os. 51. 54. 60 and 61 requi re n.:rorttng such matters ,ts errors and
1rregulanues. 11legal acts. 1ntcrn.il control structure m:lllers ,md other scn\lll\e audit da1.1
to 1he audit commmee More recent!} issued SAS, (No, 65. 66 and 71 l continue Ill
emphas11e the .1ud11 comm111ee's 1mrorwnt role in the audit rnx:ess
'the researchers sampled YSE rompa111es.whteh must uo..c .iud11 comm11tccs. The)
.iho deleted three scleued companies ,,hose secunues "ere not audited bi the Big E1gh1.
w htLh account lor 96.2 p.:rn:nt ol thl! cnuue, ,,hoSI! scrurn1es .,re ltsted on the NYSE
(Wooten ct al . 1990). Nl!xl. in ordl!r to ,Nl!rtatn hm, man) ;rndll .:omm11tec ml!m ·rs
ha,c pnmar) employa ,tUdttors (l!.g .. rnllegl! protl!ssor, and mdep.:ndcnt in,e,wr, ha,e
no such aud11ors). the rl!scarLhcrs an:tly,ed thl! sampled companies' :mnual rqxm,. \\'ho
.\udils America :m<l the Di<,elosurc data base ( ,nee the 81)! E ght t"1rms merged into the
Big Six m 1989. the results in Table II were conligun.:d into the Bi g SI\.)
'To aSL-cnain 11 the ob\l!~e<l ch1-,qu.tre ":tlue, resulted Imm ti..:, 1;111on, Irnm e\p.:l'tctl
on- or oll -dtagonal ellects or both. the author, used llotcll111~\ T",1.1u,11c to deted mean
d11lcrences lx!tv.~-cn multH an ate \,etwr, m t\,O ropula11ons (fohn,llll .ind \\ 1chern. 1982).
This test detected ,r stausucal n:lau on,h1ps along the diagonal d1lkred S1g111licantl) from
the cxp;cted dlstnbuu on for 1he ro,\ in Table 2 Rclauon, along th..: diagonal 1nd1c11e thl!
assoctauon bctv.ecn the selected or retained ,1ud1tor and the auditor emplO)ed b) the
So,uliern IJ11.s111esr Re\·1th
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commiuec member's primary employer. That is, comrruuee memtcrs tend to select some
firms more than other . The computed T1 value of 22.048 (p.<.0054) 1mphes that means
differ for some auditor . After applying a umvanate Student t-test statistic for each auc!Jt
fi rm, significant (p.<.05) c!Jfferences were detected in the means ror the CPA firms with
three largest diagonal values-Arthur Andersen, Coopers & Lybrand. and Pncc
Waterhouse (PW).
"'The full committee size was used lO define these variables Educators. consultants and
reuree were included in the count.
To obtain these data. the researchers employed the Big Six industry market share

5

siatisucs proVlded by a Big Six Aud11 Firm as of Deeemt-cr 31, 1988 (No Big Six firm had
available data for 1987). The Big E1gh1 CPA firms merged into the Big Six shortly aJ1er

the data were collected, presumably 10 reduce overhead expenses and increase their
S(X!Clahzed services. As boundary spanners. aud11 commntees should re even more likely
to select CPA fi rms that are industry-wide market kadcrs lollowing the mergers. This
shrinkage of the number of maJor CPA lirms should also increase the likelihood that
indJVJdual audn comrruttcc mcmrcrs have business rclat1onsh1ps w11h parncul,ir CPA firms
(since fewer compcutors now exist). While the data span the trans1t1on period. It 1s
hypo1hes11ed that the clku on the decision to retain or --.:lcct an c,ternal auJ11, r \\as n l!
dramaucally altered dunng the one year ume span of the study and that the effects of the
mergers probably tool-. more ume for the deep structural ch:mges to emerge
•Discnminant analysis was done using the Unt\'eNt} ol M1d11gan's (Fox and Guire.

1976) stausucal analysis soltwan:: M1ch1gan lnteracuve Data Analys" (MIDAS). Details

of MIDAS arc g1\'en in the documentauon guide listed in the relerences and two group
d1scnminan1 analysis 1s developed in Klcinlx1um. Kupper and Muller ( 1988) , n Chapter 23.
The stcpv.1sc pnx.-cdure and \anable selection method applied was basc<l on the work done
hy Cohen ( I991 ) and O'Gorman and Wool son ( I991 ).
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